In this paper, we focus on a framework of multilevel security databases. We assume subjects form a hierarchy and they have varying beliefs about existence, identities, and other properties of objects. Every subject has an object space that represents its own belief about the real world. A subject is interested in not only query of objects in its own space, but also how they relate to objects belonging to lower subjects. We introduce the concept of a skeleton that allows all cascading beliefs of a given object to be assembled in a way that is natural for users in multilevel security. Skeletons are treated as most primitive values in the model. In stored relations, tuples consist of skeletons, one for each attribute of the tuple. Any query related to this object would draw a subset of the tuple.
INTRODUCTION
A database stores reality that is an object space consisting of information about objects in (some part of) the real world. Every object has properties, including an identity that uniquely distinguishes it from other objects.
We assume that there is only one reality. An ordinary database can be used to store this single reality. However, the reality may not always be known. This is true in a belief database where multiple subjects are hypothesized, each having its own view of object space describing reality. If subjects were only interested in storage and query of their own beliefs, isolated ordinary databases will serve their purpose. We assume a more interesting situation that subjects are interested in query not only of their beliefs but how these beliefs relate to those of other subjects. In such a situation, the ordinary database paradigm is not adequate. Multilevel security data, the focus of this paper, is a special form of belief data where the subjects form a hierarchy.
In this section we introduce the basic terminology leading to a clear understanding of the problem. The terminology includes the hierarchy of subjects, objects, and object spaces of subjects. In this paper, we will use the parametric database approach to give a model and a query language for multilevel security. We will give reasons for using the parametric approach. Then we will illustrate the parametric approach to develop a model and a query language for multilevel security under some very simplifying assumptions. Then we will go on to relax the assumptions and discuss why this gives rise to serious issues that are addressed in subsequent sections.
Subject hierarchy in multilevel security
In multilevel security, subjects are users who share and query information in a database. These subjects form a hierarchy induced by a partial order (≤) on all subjects. Upper subjects can see information belonging to the lower ones. On the other hand lower subjects cannot see information belonging to upper subjects. In fact the subjects may not even be aware of subjects above them. As an example in Figure 1 , we consider the subject hierarchy. (Note that this hierarchy happens to be a lattice; a lattice is not required). It has a partial order α ≤γ, β ≤γ, λ ≤ γ, λ ≤ α, and λ ≤ β. We will use this lattice of users as a running example. We will use "user", "user level" and "subject" interchangeably. For any two users u 1 and u 2 , if u 1 ≤ u 2 and u 1 ≠ u 2 , then u 1 is said to be below u 2 or u 2 is above u 1 .
Figure 1. A user hierarchy in multilevel security
The access to object spaces for different subjects is governed by the rule given by Bell-LaPadula [5] . The rule states that an upper subject has read access to a lower subject and a lower subject has write access to an upper subject. In order to close the gap it can be added that a lower subject does not have a read privilege to an upper subject and an upper subject does not have a write privilege to a lower subject. The accesses mentioned in this rule are mandatory in multilevel security. In other words, these choices are imposed by the system upon the subjects rather than by some subjects on other subjects. A subject simply writes in its own object space. An upper subject has the privilege to see and query it. There is nothing to stop the upper subject from creating a pointer to such an object or copying it in its own space. Then the upper subject can modify the object in its own object space. All this is unknown to the lower subject. We also remark that there is not always an upper-lower relationship between all subjects. In Figure 1 , the subjects α and β are oblivious of each other and there are no read and write privileges between them; they share no information.
Subjects and objects in multilevel security
Before we proceed, we need a clear understanding of the nature of object spaces belonging to upper and lower subjects including how the objects in these spaces relate to each other. We begin with a simple example in a 2-level hierarchy. Figure 2 we consider a two level hierarchy with α as the upper subject and λ a lower subject. The object spaces belonging to subjects α and λ are shown as nodes. In our example, objects are employees and their names serve as their unique identities at each level. In addition to Name values, the Salary and DName (department name) values are also shown. The subject α believes that there are four objects in the real world: Shyam, Jim, Ying, and Jack, each with unique identity. These objects form α's object space. Similarly, λ's object space consists of Jun, Jack, and Jim. Note that because of the uniqueness of identity at each level, a name cannot repeat at the same level. However, it can repeat across different levels. For example, Jack and Jim appear in object spaces of α as well as λ.
In this hierarchy, user λ's view of reality is akin to a classical database: there is no concept of belief; every entry in its object space is seen as being correct. The subject only sees objects in its object space and is not even aware of the subject α, let alone α's object space.
The higher subject α is more interesting; it sees its objects as well as objects belonging to λ. It is natural to assume α is more resourceful. It may learn that its object Shyam is known as Jun to λ and they are not two different objects in the real world.
Similarly, Jim is known as Jim to λ. The edges represent α's concurrence with λ about the existence of objects. From our assumption on unique identity at same level, the upper user cannot connect an object at its level to more than one object at λ.
Concurrences on existence and lack of them are known to upper subject only. Furthermore, assuming that Figure 2 contains the best knowledge that α has, the following can be inferred by α: The object Jun is known to have correct salary at λ but incorrect department. Similarly, the department of Jim at lower level is correct but the salary is not. The object Ying and Jack are unknown to λ. In addition to all these, in α's view, the object known as Jack to λ does not exist in the real world.
Another example is that α believes that a total of (50K + 60K + 65K + 40K) = 215K is being paid to the employees where as λ believes that 190 K is being paid to the employees.
A subject has interest in its own object space, object space belonging to lower subjects as well as cascading concurrences about identities of objects. Collectively such object spaces and concurrences are called the belief world of the subject.
Issues in multilevel security
To formulate such kind of belief worlds in a database, the first issue is how to assemble cascading beliefs in a way such that the query language is most user-friendly. In the traditional relation models, the primitive values are atomic. If we follow this, the users would have to perform self-joins to assemble the atomic values. And with the subject levels increasing, these would be multi-way self-joins. The simplest way is to put all the related objects in one tuple. This also achieves the concept of poly-key [2, 19] to allow an object to have different identities at different levels. Then the primitive value is not an atomic value any more. Rather, it becomes a function from a domain which we call parametric space. This methodology has been termed parametric approach explained below in more detail.
The term parametric data applies to data where the values are tied down to points in some space that is simply termed the parametric space, such as a set of instants in temporal data, spatial points in spatial data, and subjects in belief data of which multilevel security is a special case.
A simple parametric model for multilevel security
As hinted above, in order to obtain a model and a query language for multilevel security, we follow the parametric approach to databases. The single goal of the parametric approach is to ensure that the query of parametric data is as natural as possible.
The term parametric approach is used when the association of a value to points in the underlying parametric space is explicitly recognized and leveraged to study parametric databases. In the parametric approach, a parametric value is modeled as a function from the parametric space. As an example, if we have a relation employee with three attributes: Name (the key value), Salary and DName (the department of an employee), then each attribute is modeled as a function. A parametric space can have any number and types of dimensions. When the parametric space is restricted to a single point, a value becomes fixed. If this parametric point is ignored, the parametric database reduces to an ordinary (classical) database. In other words, a parametric database restricted to a single point in the parametric space is isomorphic to an ordinary classical database. Therefore, an ordinary database can be considered as a parametric database where the underlying set of dimensions is empty. This means that traditional databases are for atomic values and that the parametric data and its query language are for parametric data.
Next we illustrate the parametric approach in order to develop a model and a query language for multilevel security under some very stringent and simplifying assumptions. The assumptions are: (i) the hierarchy consists of only two levels, and (ii) the only algebraic operator is a selection operator.
Functions provide a natural formalism to encode objects in Figure  2 . For example, the Name value of the object Shyam at level α that is known as Jun at level λ can be modeled as the function {(α, Shyam), (λ, Jun)}. Here, subjects α and λ are points in the belief space {α, λ}. The function assigns Shyam to α and Jun to λ. Figure 2 shows the Emp relation with Name, Salary, and DName attributes. For the sake of avoiding verbosity, we consider the following relation with only Name column.
In view of α, this relation has 5 tuples, one corresponding to each object in its belief world. It should be clear that with the function notation we are able to represent information in Figure 2 losslessly. In other words, we can go from Figure 2 to EmpN relation and vice versa. (Again, note that for avoiding verbosity we have ignored Salary, and DName attributes.)
Simple query in a multilevel security
We consider a selection operator, σ (r, μ) that restricts the domain of every tuple of relation r to μ. Here are a few examples. The above could also be expressed in SQL-style. The SQL-like query for the first one is shown below. select e.Name restricted to {α} from EmpN e where TRUE As in SQL, e ranges over tuples in EmpN relation. For each tuple e, the where clause is evaluated, which in this case is always true. A qualifying tuple is restricted to {α} as a function.
The above discussion gives a glimpse of how one defines attribute values. Tuples are simply concatenation of attribute values. Relations are sets of tuples (where keys play an important role). We also get a glimpse of relation, algebra, and a query language in parametric databases. This style can be applied to spatial and temporal databases as well [20] . However, in the following sections, we will see that we face two serious hurdles in obtaining a model and a query language for multilevel security in general.
Failure of algebraic identities
In Example 2 given below, we show that the algebraic identity that expresses "union of selections = selection of unions" fails. Following the example we will discuss why such failure has serious implications.
Example 2.
Let us revisit our illustration of selection in Section 1.3.2. Ordinarily we would expect the identity σ(r, μ 1 ∪ μ 2 ) = σ(r, μ 1 ) ∪ σ(r, μ 2 ) to hold. We show that this identity fails with r = EmpN, μ 1 = {α}, and μ 2 = {λ}. We recall the computations of σ(r, μ 1 ), σ(r, μ 2 ), and σ(r, μ 1 ∪ μ 2 ) from the previous section. Now we compute σ(r, μ 1 ) ∪ σ(r, μ 2 ):
Obviously, contrary to our hope, the identity σ(r, μ 1 ∪ μ 2 ) = σ(r, μ 1 ) ∪ σ(r, μ 2 ) fails to hold. The problem is that the computations of σ(EmpN,{α}) and σ(EmpN,{λ}) destroy the concurrences and there is no way to recapture them in the computation of σ(EmpN,{α}) ∪ σ(EmpN,{λ}). But on the other hand, σ(EmpN,{α,λ}) preserves concurrences.
Implications of the failure of algebraic identities
The failure of good identities is a serious obstacle to a userfriendly SQL-like query of multilevel security data. SQL is a declarative language that is rooted in relational algebra. An algebraic identity offers users a choice to express an SQL-like query that mimics either right hand side or left hand side of the identity. As queries are built recursively, this leads to a considerable choice for users in the way they formulate their SQL-like queries. Even the same user could formulate the query in multiple ways. This makes SQL a declarative language where users express what they want to retrieve instead of having to express how it is to be retrieved.
[1, 2] solved this problem by using a concept of what was termed an anchor. Simply stated, an anchor is the "correct" identity of an object. For the object Shyam, {(α, Shyam), (λ, Jun)}, the correct identity in view of the query user α is "Shyam". Informally, the trick is to anchor this to the whole value: Shyam || {(α, Shyam), (λ, Jun)} with the understanding that this anchoring is not user's burden; rather it is created and maintained by the system. A computation can shrink this value to Shyam || {(α, Shyam)} or to Shyam || {(λ, Jun)}, but the anchor cannot be destroyed. Thus in future if the system encounters both values it "knows" that they are fragments of one and the same object and collapse them together before presenting a computed relation to the user. This will help us ensure that the above identity will hold.
A simple concept of value for arbitrary subject hierarchy
In the previous section we saw how function-based formalism could be used to model a value in 2-level subject hierarchy in multilevel security. However, we witnessed the failure of algebraic identities and observed that such formalism was inadequate to lead to a good query language for users. When the subject hierarchy has 3 or more levels, we have an even more basic problem that a function-based formalism does not work even for modeling a value consisting of cascading beliefs. To motivate this issue, we consider the user hierarchy of Figure 1 and construct an example of an object.
Example 3.
We consider the user hierarchy of Figure 1 . Figure 3 shows an example of a single object named Jack at level γ and the entire cascading view of that object in terms of how it is known to lower users. We only concentrate on the Name value.
According to the user γ, the object Jack at level γ is known as Jim at level α, Jose at β, and Jack at λ. Therefore, there is an edge representing concurrence from γ to each level α, β, and λ, respectively. The situation is a bit more complex than this. For example, α believes that Jim at level α is known as Jim at λ. This is indicated by an edge between α and λ. The edge between Jose at β and Jack at λ indicates β's concurrence. As all users are independent, this concurrence is formed by β independently of γ.
(In other words, concurrence as a binary relation is not transitive.) However this concurrence belonging to β is of interest to γ. The figure shows the complete cascade of beliefs of the object Jack at γ. In a multilevel security database, γ would be interested in investigation (query) of this entire cascade. So far we mainly concentrated upon the views of the highest user. Figure 4 shows the view of the object of Figure 3 by lower users α, β, and λ. It is to be noted that an object in the belief world of γ gives rise to several objects at lower objects. There is not a one to one correspondence between objects at different levels. However, every user is given the view of its belief world by the system without violating any security requirements.
It should be obvious that γ is indeed the most interesting user in the database. This is the reason that in the rest of this paper we will mainly concentrate upon the highest user as well.
In Example 3, the object Jack belonging to γ is known as Jack to λ and as Jose to β. However, from β's point of view, the object is also known as Jack to λ. This entire observation could be an answer to the query that asks for all cascading identities of the object Jack belonging to all subjects. Our goal is to build a framework for natural query of belief worlds.
Now we can see why a simple functional formalism will not work. In Figure 3 at point λ we have the Name values Jack and Jim. A function cannot take multiple values at the same point. Then how can we ensure that we will have one tuple per object?
In addition what happens to the concept of anchor that we hinted was necessary to preserve algebraic identities?
This paper presents an interesting solution to this problem. By using the parametric approach, we introduce the concept of a skeleton. A skeleton is a rooted tree-like structure satisfying certain conditions. It assembles all cascading beliefs of a given object. Skeletons are the most primitive values in the model. In Example 3, the whole cascading belief will be stored in one tuple. Any query would draw a subset of it. The formulism will be introduced in Section 3. The details may seem forbidding at times. It is to be kept in mind that the aim of these theoretical details is to ensure that the concept of values is natural for the user and it can enjoy a natural and declarative query language. All complications are absorbed by the system and the theory is meant to guarantee that a system can be built that honors all the promises to a user.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Comparison with related works is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 formalizes the concept of a skeleton as a value. The formalization is developed through multiple iterations in order to show how good identities are obtained. This lays foundation for a proper definition of selection, union, intersection, and difference operators. A simple form of projection is included. However, a treatment of joins is beyond the scope of this paper. Section 4 introduces some algebraic operators and SQL-like language for the model. The paper is concluded in Section 5 with some discussion of future work.
RELATED WORK
In order to compare different models, we revisit the object in Example 3. It helps to keep in mind that in order to continue to give examples that are sufficiently interesting, we always consider user γ as the query user. Also note that although we focus on a single object, belief worlds of users consist of multiple objects. Figure 5 describes our attempt to categorize various models in MLS.
Gadia's first work [1, 2] in MLS databases explained the concept of multilevel security as it is formulated in Example 1. This necessitates the concept of poly-key to allow an object to have different identities at different levels. It showed that naïve definitions of operators would not lead to good algebraic identities which are a foundation stone of a declarative algebraic SQL-like query language. This was explained in Example 2. In retrospect, the model introduced in [1, 2] can be termed as wedgebased because as indicated in Figure 5 (b), it considered storing only two-level hierarchies in tuples. In the wedge-based model, the information in Figure 5 (b) has to be stored into 3 tuples. The papers also introduced concept of belief consistency in order to insure that information about a given object remained consistent when stored in different tuples.
In this paper, we introduce a much richer and natural skeletonbased model that allows entire hierarchies to be stored in tuples.
A skeleton is shown in Figure 5 (a). We observe that the graph in Figure 5 (a) represents a subject's cascading beliefs of an object in its belief world. We call this rooted tree-like graph a skeleton. Each node represents an object. All these objects are connected by a subject's concurrence with the subject directly below it. Note that due to the assumption on unique identities at each level, we won't have another object named Jack at λ level. However, Jack can appear at both γ and λ levels. Also note that when the hierarchy has only two levels, wedge-based model is same as skeleton-based model. In early 90's, most works seem to fall into point-based model, illustrated in Figure 5 (d). Such models don't allow poly-keys. The identity of an object has to be same at all levels. A trusted agent is hypothesized who provides keys of objects to all subjects. User levels are used as an attribute in a relation. We note however, that the concept of a trusted agent seems to undermine the security issues.
Some models can be categorized as edge-based models and further categorized into pure edge-based and grouped edge-based.
Motivation for edge-based model is to allow an object to have multiple identities [1, 2] . A pure edge-based model is illustrated in Figure 5 (c) [10, 11] . A relation consists of tuples that are pairs of user levels used as attributes in the relation. A pair is indicative of concurrence of higher user with the lower one. For objects that are only known at one level, a pair for the same level is formed.
To model the object in Example 3, a pure edge-based model needs 5 tuples. In such a model an object in our sense cannot be captured by a single tuple variable in an SQL-like query language. This would complicate traversal within an object. The requirement of belief-consistency has not been mentioned in [10, 11] .
In a grouped edge-based model [6, 7] , non-conflicting information from edges is collapsed within a single tuple. Such tuples use attributes for groups of subjects rather than single subject as in pure edge-based models. However, it seems that the grouping is highly state dependent which would be difficult to untangle in queries that are supposed to be state independent. Although this reduces redundancy in a relation, the query would become highly cumbersome. The semantics of updates also becomes cumbersome due to the belief-consistency that must be maintained by the system. In our model of this paper, the problem of belief consistency within a skeleton is built into the concept of a skeleton. The system only needs to keep track of belief inconsistency across different skeletons.
Now we switch our attention to query in various models of multilevel security. In our running example, user γ is the highest user, and the most interesting user. In a belief-based data where there is no concept of absolute correctness, it is not unreasonable to assume that γ's information is perfect. As stated above, when we traverse lower levels, the quality of the information should deteriorate. On the other hand, if the quality of the information improves at lower levels, it perhaps indicates some problems in an organization. Queries to monitor this would be easier to formulate in the skeleton-based model because traversals are selections instead of joins. The following example illustrates this.
Example 4.
With the scenario showed in Figure 3 , user γ asks the question: which users have the same quality of the identity of Jack or Jill as mine.
To answer this query, as illustrated in Figure 5 (c), edge-based model needs self-joins pivoting around Jack at γ, Jose at β and Jim at α. The same is true of wedge based model. However, in the skeleton-based model to be presented, no self-join is needed. One selection will work.
The query in Example 4 will be revisited in Section 4 after the algebra and SQL-like languages are introduced. There we will see multiple ways of expressing the query.
CONCEPT OF A VALUE
As stated before, in this section we formalize skeletons as values. This requires several iterations. The problem of formalizing skeletons as values is initially examined in Section 3.1. As seen in Section 3.2, this requires extending the definition of points in the parametric from subjects to include path expressions. To force the structure of computed values to be consistent with stored values, the concept of masking is added in Section 3.4. Then we go on to define operators on skeletons and prove that good algebraic identities hold at value level in skeleton-based model.
Tuples and relations are introduced in Section 3.3. In Section 4, the definition of skeleton will be used as a basis to show good algebraic identities will hold at relation level.
Iteration 1 -subjects as parametric points
We denote the set of all users as U. Following the style of parametric approach, this is the parametric space of points, termed security space. As our first iteration to define the concept of a value, we may try to follow the usual practice in the parametric approach and attempt to define a (parametric-or security-) value as a function from a subset of U. However, as shown in Figure 6 (b), this abstraction is not adequate to capture the skeleton in Figure 6 (a). This is because two atomic values, Jack and Jim, can not be assigned at a single point λ. The information about concurrences is also lost. Moreover, as we illustrated in Example 2, the algebraic identities fail if only subjects are used as parametric points. This problem is solved by introducing path expressions and using them as parametric points. This is covered next. 
Iteration 2 -path expressions as parametric points
A path expression is a container that is used to represent a higher user's concurrence with a lower user. If u 1 is above u 2 , then u 1 .u 2 is a path expression that is used to represent u 1 's concurrence with u 2 . We can also recursively extend this definition. A u 1 .u 2 .u 3 …..u n is a path expression if u 1 > u 2 > u 3 > … > u n . The path expression encodes the fact that each user is in concurrence with the user right after it. For example, u 1 .u 2 .u 3 means u 1 is in concurrence with u 2 and u 2 is in concurrence with u 3. Note that this does not imply that u 1 directly concurs with u 3 . In fact, due to the security requirements, we have to assume that concurrence as a binary relation is not transitive.
We denote the set of all path expressions as E. Path expressions allow us to capture cascading beliefs of objects. We may attempt to define a (parametric-) value to be a function from a subset of E. However, we only want to recognize skeletons as the meaningful values. Informally, a skeleton has a single root. Thus not every subset of E will lead to a skeleton. A set of path expressions is prefix-closed if it is closed under prefixes. (This means that if the path expression u 1 .u 2 .u 3 …..u n is in the subset then for every m<n, u 1 .u 2 .…..u m is also in the subset.) Now we define a (parametric-) value S as a function from a prefix-closed subset of E. S is formally called a skeleton.
For example, Figure 6 (c) shows the parametric representation of Figure 6 (a) as a value. Such representation allows all the cascading beliefs from different levels related to an object to be stored within a single value. Note that from Figure 6 (c), we can restore the skeleton of Figure 6 (a). Thus the definition of a value seems to capture a skeleton without losing any information.
Tuples
So far, we only considered the identities of objects, specifically, "Name" in our running example. Note that the concept of concurrence is rooted only in the identities of objects. What about the other properties of an object? A tuple is a concatenation of values that share the same domain. In our running example we add Salary and DName (department name) attributes. A tuple is shown in Figure 7 . 
. Emp relation -skeleton
Relation is a set of tuples; it captures the belief world of a subject. Figure 8 shows the belief world of γ in our running example that only shows the Name values. It consists of 7 skeletons. Recall that skeletons are rooted. It should be obvious that only maximal skeletons can form stored tuples, i.e., tuples in a relation in the database. It should be noted that a graphical representation is quite intuitive to a user.
We see that Jim at λ resides in two skeletons: one is a cascading view of Jack at γ and another is a cascading view of Jackson at β. Figure 9 shows its tabular representation in terms of 7 tuples. Note that we have to require belief consistency to ensure that all fragments of an object residing in multiple tuples are consistent. For example, the salary of Jim at λ is 80K in both tuples t1 and t7.
Figure 9. Emp relation -table

Iteration 3 -masking
A query involving a skeleton retrieves a subset of the skeleton. Even though we have not formalized the concept of a skeleton, informally it helps to keep in mind that we have a fixed skeleton in mind and we want to understand what its subsets are. For example, consider a query Q on Figure 6 (a): retrieve Jose at β and Jim at λ. We want to retrieve a single value as the result and such a value has to make sense to the query user γ. Therefore the result has to be a skeleton that is consistent with the original stored value. Otherwise, computations could become meaningless to a user. Moreover, computed values differing from stored values would inhibit composition of relational operators.
The definition of a skeleton arrived here will extend as well as override all our previous definitions and will become the concept of a value in multilevel security.
We have observed that we want our skeletons to be closed under prefixes, otherwise algebraic identities will fail. However, what if a subset to de extracted removes some portion that destroys this closure? Certainly removal of the root would always threaten the closure under prefixes. The solution in such a case is to mask the points we are intending to delete. Masking is like marking for deletions without having to do it literally.
Definition 1:
Suppose an attribute A is given. A skeleton over A is a triple <μ, V, M>, where μ is a security element (a set of path expressions); V is a function from μ such that for every point p in μ, V(p) is an atomic value of attribute A; and M is a Boolean valued function from μ, such that M(p) is TRUE or FALSE.
Thus at a point p, if M(p) is FALSE, even though the function V stores a value V(p) at p, the p is considered deleted. Later in this section we will see how the point p in such a situation can be deleted so long as the closure under prefix is not undermined. But for now it is easiest to imagine that we only mask it.
M in the above definition is called a mask of the skeleton P. A point in the domain of S is said to be masked if M(p) = FALSE. A masked point is like marking it for deletion without actually having to do so. A masked point p is indicated by putting "||" next to p (|| p) in a tabular representation and drawing a circle around the atomic value at p in a graphical representation. The result of the query Q stated above is shown in Figure 10 .
Figure 10. Query result of (β, Jose) and (λ, Jim)
A skeleton is prefix closed and together with masking it is like applying an anchor introduced in [1, 2] recursively through all levels in a user hierarchy.
In the remainder of this section we assume that a fixed but arbitrary skeleton S = <μ, V, M> on A is given. 
and ¬M 2 denote point-wise disjunction, conjunction and negation, respectively.
Lemma 1: Suppose S 1 , S 2 and S 3 are subsets of the skeleton S. Then the following identities hold:
Idempotent laws:
Associative laws:
Commutative laws:
Distributive laws:
Clearly, the algebra for skeletons taken as values satisfies all the desirable identities.
Finally, we switch our attention to redundancy in skeletons. Suppose skeleton S = <μ, V, M> is given. We first generalize our definition of a subset that would allow literal deletions. Suppose skeleton S = <μ, V, M> is given. Note that we do not want to delete the root of a skeleton. If a non-root leaf p is masked, its literal deletion will not destroy the closure under prefixes. Therefore p can be removed from μ, V, as well as M. This process can be repeated until necessary to remove all masked leaves. We denote the resulting skeleton <μ, V, M> as |S|, called the reduced skeleton of S. A reduced skeleton does not contain a masked leaf. 
Lemma 2:
The relation ≡ among skeletons that are subsets of a given skeleton is an equivalence relation.
Definition 3:
Suppose <μ 1 , V 1 , M 1 > and <μ 2 , V 2 , M 2 > are subsets of <μ, V, M>. Then we define union, intersection, and complementation as follows:
Note that functions are sets of ordered pairs. Therefore, V 1 ∪ V 2 , and V 1 ∩ V 2 make sense. The * simply indicates that we should not destroy the closure under prefixes.
Lemma 3: Suppose S 1 , S 2 , T 1 , T 2 are subsets of S such that S 1 ≡ S 2 and T 1 ≡ T 2 . Then the following holds:
The following Theorem follows.
Theorem 1:
The identities stated in Lemma 1 hold up to equivalence for arbitrary subsets S 1 , S 2 and S 3 which are subsets of the skeleton S.
We remark that Lemma 1 as well as Theorem 1 is interesting on its own right. Lemma 1 is a convenient way of formulating a theoretical milestone that is relatively easier to reach. With Lemma 1, we will keep the whole skeleton structure (which is the same as stored value) with irrelevant part masked in any computation. It represents a line of thought that may play a role in future research even if one is only interested in obtaining results along the lines of Theorem 1. In Theorem 1, the identities (except those that involve unary complementation) hold up to equivalence. This means that in our computations we can ignore tail ends when they do not matter. These skeletons with deleted tail ends carry enough information that is necessary to an outer operator. This is appropriate in databases as query processing is stream-based. A reduced skeleton carries bare minimum information in order to guarantee good algebraic identities. Also note that this reduction is within a value that will result from a selection operator only if the chosen skeleton is of continued interest in a query. Depending upon a query, some or most skeletons will be deleted completely and not carried to the next operator.
A reduced skeleton can be considered as a canonical representative of an equivalence class. Interestingly, there is also a maximal canonical representative that exists even though we may lose track of it once we start removing unneeded tail ends when algebraic expressions are computed.
Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 lead to a good definition for operators that involve selection of a relation as well as union, intersection, and difference of such selections. Cascading beliefs are based on identities of objects; therefore tuples make no sense if the key attributes are removed. Thus in a projection operator, one should not remove any key attribute.
Skeletons are the most primitive form of values in our model. These values obey good algebraic identities. A good concept of value is a necessary stepping stone to a model and a query language.
RELATIONAL ALGEBRA
In this section, we define tuples and relations to complete the definition of the model. Then we give a brief discussion of how to develop algebraic operators for relations. The algebra lays foundation for an SQL-like query language. A full fledged treatment of a query language is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we will give an adequate treatment of selection, union, intersection, and difference operators. We will only consider simple form of projection. We will not discuss any join operators. Our primary objective is to complete a full cycle to show that algebraic identity discussed in Example 2 will actually hold in the skeleton-based model. At the same time we will provide some details leading to an SQL-like query language limited to query of a single relation. Our treatment of the algebra and SQL will be a bit informal, driven by examples.
We have already developed the concept of an attribute value. An attribute value is a skeleton <μ, V, M>. A tuple is concatenation of attribute values that share the same skeleton structure. The atomic values are of course drawn from the domains of respective attributes. Figure 8 and 9 show graphical and tabular representations of a relation. Note that skeletons are by definition rooted. Only maximal (rooted) skeletons can form stored tuples in a stored relation in a database. Any query would draw a subset of it. Note that some tuples can overlap in an object with the same identity. In such a case, the tuples must also agree on non-key attributes. This condition is termed belief-consistency. We feel that of the two representations, it is the graphical representation of a relation that is more intuitive to a user.
Example 5:
As promised before, we revisit Example 4. Recall that the user γ asks the question: which users have the same quality of identity of Jack or Jill as mine. This query can be expressed as follows:
Let's evaluate this for the relation of Figure 8 and 9.
In tuple t1, Jack occurs at γ, γ.λ as well as γ.β.λ. The expression γ.// follows the syntax of XPath and XQuery [18] . For our hierarchy of Figure 1 , it evaluates to {γ, γ.α, γ.β, γ.λ, γ.α.λ, γ.β.λ}. Therefore, for tuple t1, (
γ.α, γ.β, γ.λ, γ.α.λ, γ.β.λ}) = {γ, γ.λ, γ.β.λ}. This expression evaluates to empty set for tuple t4 and all the remaining tuples as well.
Next, the relational expression
This returns the relation shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12 . In Figure 11 , we keep the whole skeleton. In Figure 12 , we keep the reduced skeleton which carries bare minimum information in order to guarantee good algebraic identities. It doesn't matter whether users think of the result as whole skeletons or reduced ones. It should be also noted that this entire calculation is very intuitive for the graphical representation of the relation.
. This evaluates to the union of domains of all tuples returned by the selection operator. In this case selection returns only one tuple. Thus, the final answer is {γ, γ.λ, γ.β.λ}. Furthermore, because of the use of path expressions as points in the underlying parametric space, the result {γ, γ.λ, γ.β.λ} is very informative as well as non-lossy. Without path expressions, the best we could have done in some hypothetical language is to return λ instead of relating it to γ.λ and γ.β.λ. The path γ.λ, indicates the concurrence of user γ with user λ, which is different from γ.β.λ, which indicates that user γ concurs with user β, and again user β concurs with user λ. This ensures that results of subexpressions will not corrupt computations of an expression. In parametric approach, results always remain meaningful. Perhaps an operator could be added that coerces {γ, γ.λ, γ.β.λ} into {γ, λ} if that is what the user must have. However, such features have to be added to a query language with extreme care.
Following are some of many alternative ways of expressing this query.
•
Depending upon their thought process, different users can formulate this query in variety of ways. The formalism presented in this paper is enforced by the system that is reassuring to them that their queries are correct. Note that the users can pretend to interact with the graphical representation of relations leading to a very natural query interface. In an SQL-like language, the query can be expressed in a variety of ways including the following.
[ Note that the where clause is redundant in our examples. In the parametric approach [20] , this argument is a boolean expression not covered in this paper. When present, it is applied before the restricted to clause to determine if a given tuple qualifies at all. If it does not, it is discarded immediately without considering restricted to clause for that tuple. It is important to note that the boolean expressions in parametric model are provably more powerful compared to that in classical SQL. A full appreciation of this issue would require discussion that is beyond the scope of the paper.
We note that the above query would be difficult to express in point-based, edge-based, and even wedge-based models as it would require self-joins. A result such as {γ, γ.λ, γ.β.λ} would be rather difficult to capture.
We took the freedom of giving above example informally. Some formalism needs to be developed to ensure that all the variations of algebraic expressions mentioned above will indeed retrieve the same result. We proved that when algebraic operators are applied to values, desired identities hold. Now we proceed to prove that the identities also hold when algebraic operators are applied at relation level. 
Lemma 7:
Suppose X is a tuple in a relation r, A is an attribute, and μ 1 and μ 2 are domain expressions.
Proof of Lemma 7: we only prove (i), the proofs of (ii) and (iii) are similar. 
It's obvious that Lemma 8 holds with Lemma 7.
Theorem 2:
The following two algebraic identities hold:
(ii) σ(r, μ 1 )-σ(r, μ 2 )= σ(r, μ 1 -μ 2 ).
Proof of Theorem 2: we only need to prove (i), the proof of (ii) is quite similar to the proof of (i). 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have used the parametric approach to build a model for multilevel security. Our Skeleton-based model assembles cascading beliefs of an object. This relieves the user the burden of having to assemble cascading of beliefs through multiple self-joins. The whole theoretical framework and mechanisms introduced in this paper are meant to be absorbed by the system. The user takes them for granted. Seemingly equivalent SQL queries are indeed equivalent. The user never has to worry about retrieving lossy or incorrect information.
A treatment of join operators and a full fledged query language are beyond the scope of this paper. Operations to create and update relations are also beyond the scope of this paper. For the wedge-based model these have been introduced in [1, 2] . Note that concurrence is a 2-level issue; therefore the existing framework in [1, 2] would apply readily to the model presented in this paper. There are some interesting updates that allow an upper user to subscribe to properties, e.g. Salary, of objects belonging to lower users. What this means is whenever the lower user updates a salary of the subscribed object the salary is propagated to the object belonging to the upper user.
We note that the graphical representation of relations as shown in Figure 8 would be very intuitive to users of multilevel security. Belief consistency is built in within a skeleton. It is only required for few objects where skeletons meet. Perhaps even that can be eliminated by considering a graphical query language that takes the whole relation as graph into account.
It turns out that expressing queries in multilevel security can be complex even in a natural language. The query language along the lines in this paper will give rise to phrases that could be seen to augment the natural language itself. An extended natural language, obtained in this way, would be much better equipped to pose complex queries in multilevel security with greater ease.
In multilevel security, it is natural to expect that the information at upper levels should be of higher quality than that at lower levels. One can perhaps formulate some principles to measure this. This would help organizations to monitor the quality of their database and detect causes when the quality is not acceptable. We feel that our skeleton-based model should prove to be highly conducive to this.
This paper exhibits the usefulness of the parametric approach. The parametric approach allows values to have any number and types of dimensions. This paper was essentially an exploration of the belief dimension that arises in multilevel security. There are other forms of belief dimensions. A type of belief dimension was introduced in [13, 19] to formally define the concept of error in every day record keeping. In fact the concept of anchor was first introduced there. The framework in that paper allows sophisticated query of errors and other events while such errors took place. Another example of belief data arises in scientific data. For example, just as temperature varies from one point in space to another and one instant of time to another, its prediction varied from one numeric model of simulation to another. These models can be seen as points in a belief space. This form of beliefs is not quite complex as well because simulation models are not independent of each other but rather they share some underlying techniques and artifacts varying degrees. Once developed, a framework that models such beliefs would allow scientists to be able to query meteorological data for hypothesis testing and refinement of their models. All the forms of parametric data mentioned in this paper: multilevel security, errors, numerical simulation, space, time and any other abstract dimensions can be approached through the parametric approach. The SQL-like language presented in this paper is to be considered a fragment of ParaSQL the query language for parametric databases that is being developed on an ongoing basis.
We hope that this paper brings out many interesting issues relevant to multilevel security and provided some solutions. We hope that there is a renewed activity in this very intriguing topic in databases and it will be enriched from works originating from various quarters providing their insights.
